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Arming the Pregnancy Police: More Outlandish
Concoctions?*
Jeffrey A. Parness**
Emotions abound when encountering a newborn with disabilities
which will inevitably lead to an early death or to a less than whole
and healthy life. It is especially painful when such disabilities were
preventable. Anger swells, fingers are pointed, fault is assigned, initiatives
are promised, tears are shed. To seek to assure that more humans are
born with sound minds and healthy bodies seems as American as apple
pie. Governmental efforts appear appropriate.
For several years now, a national debate-often heated and impas-
sioned-has focused on the legal treatment of disabilities attributable to
prenatal drug or alcohol use. What, if anything, may and should gov-
ernments do to limit such disabilities? What non-financial constraints,
if any, operate when such a mission is undertaken? And, as our un-
derstanding of the causes and cures of such disabilities grows, what in
fact have we been doing? This paper addresses these questions, dwelling
particularly on coercive laws designed to protect potential human life.
It will be urged first that the widespread view that Roe v. Wade'
bars significant governmental protection of the unborn is misguided;
that the case, in fact, suggests there are a variety of legitimate avenues
for protective efforts (whether or not the unborn are deemed persons);
and, that in the years since Roe, there have been many noteworthy
initiatives. Recent reforms include coercive laws seeking to reduce drug
or alcohol-related birth disabilities. Such laws require close scrutiny when
constitutional interests are present.
After generally reviewing contemporary initiatives on behalf of the
unborn, efforts in Winnebago County, Illinois will be examined in detail.
These inquiries will reveal some of the difficulties with state protection
of potential human life. Sexually discriminatory initiatives, as well as
inconsistent enforcement of state policy, will be found. Suggestions for
change will then be offered, including the view that the arming of the
pregnancy police should not be limited to an arsenal used only against
* Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1432 (1991) (reference
to the author's earlier, and very early, works).
** Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; J.D., The University of Chicago;
B.A., Colby College.
1. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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pregnant women, but should encompass arms against all who act against
the unborn.
I. PROTECTING THE UNBORN UNDER ROE V. WADE
The promotion of live births and the prevention of disabilities in
newborns certainly constitute legitimate governmental interests. As such
pursuits typically involve state action prior to human birth, many have
characterized them as involving the protection of potential human life.
The United States Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, expressly recognized
and approved a government's "important and legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life." 2 Seemingly, potential human life
is protected through laws promoting live and healthy births, whereas
human life is protected through laws promoting the continuing live and
healthy condition of those crawling or walking on earth today. Potential
human life is today protected by laws within such diverse areas as torts,
crimes, and child custody.
On occasion, lawmakers will seek to protect potential human life
by equating certain unborn with those already born. For example, an
already-born child and a developing fetus may each be the possible
victim of parental abuse and neglect,3 while both a pregnant woman
and her unborn child may be patients of a certain doctor. 4 On other
occasions, lawmakers protect potential human life though rejecting any
equation involving the unborn and those already born. For example,
some states have both homicide and feticide laws within their criminal
codes.'
The protection of potential human life can be significantly promoted
through many forms of law. Certain protections are most appropriate
for state governments (criminal, tort, and child custody laws), while
others are best undertaken at the national level (laws financing research
2. Id. at 162, 93 S. Ct. at 731.
3. Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988) ("If a parent of a minor child wilfully omits,
without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance,
or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
A child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar as this
section is concerned.").
4. While most state courts allow children to sue their mothers' doctors for injuries
resulting from conduct after their conception but prior to their birth, some courts recognize
claims for injuries resulting from preconception conduct. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite
Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Il. 1977) and Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989).
5. Compare La. R.S. 14:29 (1986) (first degree murder) and 14:32.6 (Supp. 1992)
(first degree feticide); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 11 9-1 (first degree murder), 9-1.2 (intentional
homicide of an unborn child) (1989); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.185 (West Supp. 1992)
(murder in the first degree), 609.2661 (West 1987) (murder of an unborn child in the
first degree).
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and access to prenatal care). Laws protective of potential human life
can serve the unborn exclusively or can simultaneously promote other
interests, such as maternal health. At times, the protection of potential
human life is only an unintended (or peripheral) consequence of a law
chiefly serving other goals.
Laws can protect potential human life in a variety of ways. They
can make money, food, and medical care available to pregnant women.
They can help to educate future parents and others on how to promote
live births and prevent birth disabilities. And, they can work in more
coercive ways. Tort claims or criminal prosecutions for acts harmful to
some unborn will deter similar conduct, and may serve compensatory
or retributive aims. Coercive legal action can also seek to prevent fore-
seeable harm to certain unborn by enjoining the conduct of those then
involved in the childbearing process. At the extreme, onerous conditions
might be imposed.
In protecting potential human life, governments are subject to tra-
ditional, non-financial constraints. Laws must be neither arbitrary nor
capricious; they must promote some legitimate goal. Thus, laws pro-
tecting the unborn must at least be founded on nontrivial connections
between the conduct regulated and some chance for promoting live and
healthy births. There are further limits when laws burden constitutionally-
protected interests. Such limits, as well as the difficulties in observing
such limits, can be well illustrated by reviewing more fully the often-
misunderstood decision in Roe v. Wade.
At issue in Roe was a state statute which effectively prohibited most
pregnant women from procuring abortions. The statute thus protected
potential human life, thereby serving an interest which the Court deemed
"important and legitimate." ' 6 Yet, because the statute burdened a wom-
an's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy, a right which was
found within the federal constitutional privacy domain, and because the
state's interest in all fetuses was not "compelling, ' 7 the statute was
invalidated. The Court did observe that the state had a compelling
interest in protecting all viable fetuses so that third-trimester abortions
generally could be outlawed .
While Roe v. Wade was concerned with privacy in pregnancy ter-.
mination, the Court's decision suggests that a "compelling state interest ' 9
will be necessary to sustain any law protecting potential life but burdening
comparable constitutional concerns. Other relevant concerns include pri-
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162, 93 S. Ct. 705, 731 (1973).
7. Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
8. Id. at 163-64, 93 S. Ct. at 732 (noting that late abortions could not be barred
if the preservation of the life or health of the mother was involved).
9. Id. at 155, 93 S. Ct. at 728. More recently, members of the Court have looked
for undue burdens. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
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vacy in childbegetting, childrearing, medical decisionmaking, and bodily
integrity.
Because governments are much freer to act where constitutional
concerns are neither present nor unduly burdened though present, and
because pregnant (as well as fertile) women often can raise such concerns
when subjected to laws seeking to protect their future offspring, most
laws promoting live and healthy births involve nonmaternal conduct. Of
course, where the conduct of prospective mothers is addressed, the
protection of potential human life is usually welcomed by would-be
mothers, as these women typically join the state in seeking live and
healthy births. In only limited circumstances will a state determine that
it should regulate a woman's conduct against her wishes in order to
benefit her future offspring. When such regulation sufficiently burdens
constitutional concerns, the rationale(s) supporting governmental action
must, of course, be compelling.
II. RECENT LAWS PROTECTING THE UNBORN
Within the limits of Roe v. Wade, American governments have
recently undertaken significant initiatives protective of the unborn. An
examination of these initiatives reveals wide variations in the types of
laws now concerned with promoting live and healthy human births.
A major development in the regulation of nonmaternal conduct
involves statutes characterizing the unborn as victims of crime. Early
in 1986, Minnesota created a distinct statutory scheme providing broad
criminal law protection of the unborn. 0 The scheme encompasses varying
forms of culpable conduct (premeditated, intentional, grossly negligent,
and negligent acts) and of injury (involving either the termination of
potential life or birth disabilities). Later that year Illinois adopted a
similar scheme, with the unborn deemed possible victims of intentional
homicide, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, reckless
homicide, battery, and aggravated battery." In 1987, North Dakota
added several crimes against the unborn, including murder, manslaughter,
negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and assault.' Since then, Wash-
ington has redefined assault in the second degree to include acts harming
an unborn quick child.' 3 Of course, such alterations in criminal laws
often encourage related civil laws to extend greater potential life pro-
tectioni.
Another significant development in the regulation of nonmaternal
conduct involves the expansion of tort laws to cover claims by those
10. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.266 to 609.269 (West 1987 and Supp. 1992).
11. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 19-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (1989).
12. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.1-17.1-08 (Supp. 1991).
13. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1991).
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whose birth disabilities were caused by the defendants' actions. In many
states, claimants can include those who were previable at the time of
the tortious conduct.1 4 Some states have expanded tort laws even further,
permitting claims by those who were preconceived at the time of the
tortious conduct.15
Where laws protecting the unborn address the conduct of prospective
parents, there is often little controversy. For instance, consider laws
providing for better prenatal care (nutritional food supplements to low-
income pregnant women); treatment of drug or alcohol abuse on a
voluntary basis; warning labels on products which cause disabilities at
birth; and, financial support of scientific research on human procreation
and birth. Such laws are relatively noncontroversial because they are
noncoercive.
Laws protecting the unborn are usually most controversial when they
operate coercively, especially against pregnant women. As noted earlier,
when such laws unduly burden constitutional concerns, they must serve
a compelling state interest. Yet, state interests are often difficult to
assess, as it is hard to evaluate (or even describe) the consequences of
coercive laws before (and even after) their implementation. Since laws
protecting the unborn often are premised on speculation about human
conduct, they require continuing reassessment.
Laws involving drug use by pregnant women illustrate some of the
difficulties. Laws may or do allow drug use during pregnancy to justify:
1. a criminal prosecution;
2. the suspension or termination of parental rights; and/or,
3. restrictions on the activities of a pregnant woman and those
around her.
Criminal child abuse (or similar) prosecutions of women who ingest
illegal drugs during pregnancy may now be possible in some states. In
California, for example, the Penal Code defines as a misdemeanor a
parent's willful omission, without legal excuse, to furnish necessary
medical attendance or other remedial care for his or her child, and
thereafter characterizes one conceived but not yet born as a child. 6 The
provision seemingly can be applied in at least some settings with no
infringement upon constitutional rights, and such applications would
clearly promote what the Roe majority called the "important and le-
14. Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976); Womach v. Buchhorn, 187
N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960); see
also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I1. 1988) (reviewing developments generally,
and in Illinois in particular).
15. Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing recent
preconcepion tort cases).
16. Cal. Penal Code § 270 (West 1988).
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gitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.' ' 7 The
much-publicized California trial court dismissal in 1986 of child abuse
charges against Pamela Rae Stewart (who, while pregnant, ignored a
doctor's warning about taking certain drugs) casts a cloud on the statute's
applicability to prebirth maternal conduct.' 8 Successful criminal child
abuse prosecution of women bearing drug-exposed newborns may require
the enactment of even more particular statutes.
On the civil side, a court may be able to suspend a mother's custodial
rights on account of her prebirth conduct or to restrict a pregnant
woman's conduct in order to protect her future offspring. Given a trial
court finding that certain forms of prenatal drug use may cause sig-
nificant harm to developing fetuses, can such conduct ever support (alone
or with other acts) an order suspending at birth a woman's interest in
her newborn or in her earlier-born children? And, assuming constitutional
concerns are implicated, may there ever be a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest (especially in noncriminal conduct) to sustain an
injunction restricting a pregnant woman's drug intake in order to protect
the potentiality for life?
Courts and legislatures involved in child custody laws have been
increasingly concerned with the prebirth conduct of all prospective par-
ents. Some lawmakers have recently determined that drug-exposed infants
can be deemed neglected under custody laws by mothers who took
controlled substances during pregnancy.' 9 Such findings usually do not
result in the full loss of parental rights; rather, they typically trigger
only a temporary loss, or the imposition of conditions (such as drug
rehabilitation and counselling) for the new mother. Not long ago, the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that a man who fails to support his unborn
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162, 93 S. Ct. 705, 731 (1973).
18. Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During
Pregnancy, 64 Ind. L.J. 357 (1988-1989) (reviewing the Stewart case and urging restraints
on the use of criminal penalties against pregnant women); Note, Maternal Rights and
Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 994 (1988) (similar).
19. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1101 (West Supp. 1992) ("[D]eprived child"
includes some children born in a condition of dependence on a controlled dangerous
substance), 1130 (West 1987) (circumstances under which a deprived child can be subject
to termination of parental rights); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986) (finding
of child abuse by juvenile court can be predicated solely upon mother's prenatal conduct
involving heroin use). Compare In re Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 529 (App. 3d 1981)
(finding a fetus is not a person able to be adjudged dependent by a juvenile court and
thus a pregnant woman's detention was illegal, but in a setting where the prospective
mother was allegedly mentally ill and where the state had not afforded her a commitment
hearing); In re Dittrick Infant, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (Probate Code
does not permit custody order regarding unborn child, though Code amendments are
desirable). For a general review of recent statutes, see Julia Elizabeth Jones, Comment,
State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 La. L. Rev. 1159, 1164-65 (1992).
[Vol. 53
1992] PROSECUTING TO PROTECT THE UNBORN 433
child's mother prior to his child's birth loses his standing in (and thus
his need to give his consent to) a later adoption proceeding. 20 Specifically,
the court stated, "Because prenatal care of the pregnant mother and
unborn child is critical to the well-being of the child and of society,
the biological father, wed or unwed, has a responsibility to provide
support during the prebirth period."'"
Comparably, there have been new laws which seek to prevent harm
to the unborn. Some courts have ordered that pregnant (or nonpregnant
fertile) women using controlled substances, or otherwise acting danger-
ously toward their unborn, must take certain action to protect potential
human life. Orders have been issued by courts with jurisdiction over
family, juvenile, and criminal matters. While criminal court orders against
women during sentencing have met with difficulty, civil court orders
have met with more success. 2 Particularly troublesome, of course, are
orders against women whose condemned conduct is not otherwise crim-
inal. Orders on alcohol consumption or smoking during pregnancy come
to mind. In 1983, a court was asked to assume custody over a previable
fetus and to order a pregnant woman to undergo a "purse string"
operation so that her cervix would better hold the pregnancy. In declining
the request, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reflected the
uncertainties when it said:
We do not decide whether, in some situations, there would be
justification for ordering a wife to submit to medical treatment
in order to assist carrying a child to term. Perhaps the State's •
interest, in some circumstances, might be sufficiently compelling
... to justify such a restriction on a person's constitutional
right of privacy.23
20. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
21. Id. at 746; see also State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran S. Serv., 227 N.W.2d 643
(Wis. 1975) (prebirth acts of father constitute child abandonment).
22. Consider, e.g., Jack P. Lipton, Colin F. Campbell, The Constitutionality of
Court-Imposed Birth Control as a Condition of Probation, 6 J. of Hum. Rts. 271, 298
(1989) (terms of probation for pregnant woman convicted of attempted child abuse of
born children included woman's submission to urinalysis testing for drugs and enrollment
in parenting and prenatal care classes); Thomas E. Bartrum, Note, Birth Control as a
Condition of Probation-A New Weapon in the War Against Child Abuse, 80 Ky. L.J.
1037 (1991-92). Michael T. Flannery, Court-Ordered Prenatal Intervention: A Final Means
to the End of Gestational Substance Abuse, 30 J. Fain. L. 519 (1991-92); Rorie Sherman,
Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, .11 Nat'l L.J. I (Oct. 3, 1988) (civil court orders); David
F. Chavkin, "For Their Own Good": Civil Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-Dependent
Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 224, 228 (1992) (concluding that civil commitment is
inappropriate as long as voluntary treatment can not be provided for all who desire it).
23. Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. 1983); see also Debra C. Moss, Labor
of Love, A.B.A. J. 32 (Dec. 1986) (describing case of pregnant, brain-dead woman whose
life support system was ordered continued at the prospective father's request notwith-
standing her parents' objections).
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As noted earlier, it is often difficult to assess the utility of laws
mandating behavior by potential parents and others. Difficulties arise
in determining the causal connection between certain conduct and un-
acceptable risks for the unborn. Medical assessments of risk are difficult.
And, the imposition of legal obligations in order to protect the unborn
often has a chilling effect on the lawful conduct of potential parents
or others, where the effect at times may do the unborn more harm
than good. Thus, account must be taken of the prospect that laws
seeking to protect the unborn might deter too much beneficial conduct
or promote too much undesired conduct. Protective laws could dis-
courage pregnant women from seeking prenatal care, inhibit pregnant
women from disclosing important information to their medical atten-
dants, or encourage pregnant women to procure abortions.24
Thus, caution is needed in developing coercive laws protective of
the unborn. Many difficulties can be avoided by employing narrowly-
focused statutes, rules and precedents which specifically address forms
of coercive state interventions on behalf of potential life. There is no
question today about the relationship between certain forms of conduct
and harm to the unborn. Governments should generally choose to in-
tervene only where the assessments of risk are beyond dispute and the
dangers posed are significant. While the chilling effect on access to
prenatal care, the doctor-patient relationship, and the like must always
be considered, along with the difficulties in assessing a law's utility,
legal protection of the unborn by coercion is warranted in certain settings
because there exist weightier countervailing interests. Further, the danger
in overestimating the nature and degree of chilling effects should not
be overlooked. Preexisting laws may already trigger a significant chill
so that the effects of new laws may be minimal. Consider, for example,
the marginal chilling effect of an occasional criminal prosecution in-
volving especially egregious prenatal drug use when there already exist
child abuse reporting laws covering drug-exposed newborns. Further,
there are significant educational benefits which should flow from the
mere existence of coercive laws. Public misunderstanding of the holding
24. Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women's Liberty, 43 Hastings L.J. 569, 601-04 (1992) (access to prenatal care and medical
information); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 447 n. 129 (1983) (concerns over encouraging
abortion). Of course, as we now often choose to discourage abortions to protect potential
human life, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) (no federal constitutional
violation in public funding of childbirth, but not abortion, expenses), we may choose in
the future to encourage certain abortions. Irving B. Harris and Nancy F. Schulte, The
Crisis in Cook County, Chi. Trib., June 16, 1992, § 1, at 19, col. 3 (denial of public
funds for abortion in Cook County Hospital often leads to babies born with serious
health problems, "exacerbating the already difficult circumstances they and their families
face").
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in Roe v. Wade would diminish as sensitivity grew regarding the potential
legal protections which could be afforded the unborn outside the abortion
setting. Finally, while coercing conduct to protect the unborn involves
important and legitimate state interests, such interests should be uni-
formly promoted. That is, laws protecting potential human life must
apply comparably to all those whose acts endanger whole and healthy
births. Women, or pregnant women, alone should not be targeted. And
certainly, the poor alone should not be the subjects of state coercion.
Laws regarding a prospective father's legal duties to his unborn child,
as well as tort and criminal laws protecting the unborn from hostile
acts by strangers, are needed. Such laws usually inure to the benefit of
women seeking the birth of live and healthy children, and their en-
forcement negates notions that laws relating to the unborn discriminate
against the poor or women.
III. PROTECTION OF THE UNBORN IN WINNEBAGO COUNTY, ILLINOIS
A. Introduction
The variety of coercive governmental actions on behalf of the un-
born, the integration of such actions with noncoercive state initiatives,
the desirability of uniformly applying legal protections afforded the
unborn, and the continuing misunderstanding of the limits posed by
Roe v. Wade can all be reviewed through an examination of recent
events in Winnebago County, Illinois. This geographical area is well-
suited for the inquiry due to the strong history in Illinois of protecting
the unborn and to the recent vigorous pursuit of this interest by Win-
nebago County officials. In this area, much attention has been directed
toward one Winnebago County, Illinois, official. In 1989, State's At-
torney Paul Logli undertook an attempted criminal prosecution of Me-
lanie Green for delivering cocaine to her unborn baby.2" Criticism and
praise followed, with the debate extending far beyond the county and
the state. Unfortunately, this debate rarely-if ever-included reference
to other Illinois state action on behalf of the unborn. A more complete
exploration of recent state and local efforts provides a better avenue
for critiquing the attempted prosecution of Melanie Green and, more
generally, for examining American governmental policies on the unborn.
The inquiry into Winnebago County events will be done chrono-
logically. This permits a contextual analysis, especially of the well-
publicized failure of a grand jury to indict Melanie Green. The review
25. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Logli's more general views on the
prosecutor's role in dealing with drug-exposed newborns can be found in Paul A. Logli,
The Prosecutor's Role in Solving the Problems of Prenatal Drug Use and Substance
Abused Children, 43 Hastings L.J. 559 (1992).
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will begin with events following Roe v. Wade, and demonstrate how
the decision served as a lightning rod for efforts to protect the unborn
in Winnebago County, in Illinois, and in the country.
B. The Aftermath of Roe v. Wade in Winnebago County, Illinois
Not long after the decision in Roe v. Wade, the houses of the
Illinois General Assembly adopted a joint resolution on abortion which
it then sent to Congress. The resolution, based on its displeasure with
Roe, was aimed at extending protection to "all unborn human life
throughout its development," as well as at assuring unborn human life
the equal protection of law. 26 Shortly thereafter, the Assembly revised
state abortion laws in order "to protect the right to life of the unborn
child from conception," specifically declaring that if Roe v. Wade ever
fell, then there shall be reinstated the former policy prohibiting abortions
unless necessary to preserve maternal health.27 The former policy seem-
ingly exempted women seeking abortions from criminal prosecution as
it defined abortion as including the use by "a person" of an instrument,
drug or other substance "with the intent to procure a miscarriage of
any woman." '28
A few years later, the Illinois Supreme Court reasserted its com-
mitment to protecting potential human life. In 1977 in Renslow v.
Mennonite Hospital,2 9 the court removed the requirement that a tort
plaintiff must have been conceived prior to the conduct on which the
claim is based. Renslow was founded on the determination that in Illinois
there was "a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably
caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother," 30 as well as a
longstanding "public policy ... to protect children not in being at the
time of a particular wrongful act." ' 3' The decision had been preceded
by earlier tort law rulings favoring the unborn. One case involved a
claim by the administratrix of the estate of a child who suffered prenatal
injuries, was thereafter born alive, but then died.3 2 The court held that
a claim could be pursued against those whose negligence caused the
death, saying the claim operated for the benefit of the child's next of
kin. The court relied, in part, on the right of a child to commence life
unimpaired by physical or mental defects caused by negligence to a
26. S.J. Res. 32, 78th Gen. Assembly, Senate Journal of Illinois 4390 (1974).
27. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 81-21 (1989) (stating legislative intent for Illinois Abortion
Law of 1975).
28. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 23-1 (1971) (repealed 1973).
29. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (11. 1977).
30. Id. at 1255.
31. Id. at 1259 (Dooley, J., concurring).
32. Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1953).
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viable child en ventre sa mere.3" Another early case recognized an action
on behalf of an infant for personal injuries resulting from acts under-
taken while the infant was a viable fetus; the decision was similarly
based on the interest in promoting the commencement of life unim-
paired .4
Protection of the unborn under criminal law was considered by
Illinois' high court a few years after Renslow. In the 1980 case of People
v. Greer,35 Alan Greer had killed both his girlfriend and her eight and
a half month-old fetus by beating the girlfriend with his fists, kicking
her with his feet, and striking her repeatedly with a broomstick which
broke during the beating. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled Alan Greer
could not be prosecuted for the death of the fetus under the existing
homicide statute since the fetus had never been born alive.3 6 The court
recognized the legitimacy of a feticide law, however, when it said,
"Although ... the State's argument that the intentional destruction of
a viable fetus should be included in the definition of murder might well
be adopted by the General Assembly, the fact is that a contrary intent
is manifest." 3 7
A feticide law followed a year later.3" Yet, it afforded the unborn
only limited protection. First, the new crime of feticide required that
the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the fetus'
mother was pregnant.3 9 Second, it required that the defendant either
intended to commit a felony against the pregnant woman or acted in
a way which evidenced knowledge that there would likely be death or
great bodily harm to the mother. 40 Thus, seemingly excluded from the
new law were acts of pregnant women. More important, excluded were
assaults against women not visibly pregnant or otherwise reasonably
known to be pregnant. Most importantly, only fetuses capable "of
sustained life outside the mother's womb" could be victims. 4 ' Such
limited coverage was not assuaged by the legislative declaration that
prosecutions under other laws were not prohibited, 42 since the born alive
rule of Greer remained.
33. Id. at 416-17.
34. Rodriguez v. Patti, 114 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1953).
35. 402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980).
36. Id. at 209.
37. Id.
38. The law, since repealed, is reprinted in Michael Kevin Nowak, Comment, Feticide
in Illinois: Legislative Amelioration of a Common Law Rule, 4 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 91,
92 n.8 (1983).
39. Id. at 92 n.8 (§ 9-1.1(a)(4)).
40. Id. at 92 n.8 (§ 9-.1 l(a)(1-3)).
41. Id. at 92 n.8 (§ 9-1.1(b)).
42. Id. at 93 n.8 (§ 9-1.1(e)).
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Yet, the born alive rule was not always applicable. Consider the
1982 conviction in Winnebago County of Terry Bolar for reckless hom-
icide.4 3 Bolar, while intoxicated, sped his car through a stop sign, hitting
a car carrying Kelly Oswald, who was more than eight months pregnant.
The collision caused Kelly's placenta to separate from the uterine wall
prematurely, triggered an emergency caesarian section, and ultimately
resulted in the death of her child who exhibited only a few heartbeats
and died within minutes after birth.
Protection of the unborn in a child custody setting was at issue in
a Champaign County, Illinois, case in 1984." In the case, a woman
who had given birth to a heroin-addicted child appeared before a trial
judge for a custody hearing. The hearing resulted from a finding that
the woman's drug use during pregnancy constituted child abuse. At the
hearing, the judge learned that the woman was again pregnant and still
addicted to heroin. The judge ruled that the fetus was an abused minor
and appointed an officer of the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) as guardian of the fetus. He ordered the woman
to cooperate with DCFS and to try controlling her heroin intake. DCFS
moved to vacate the order, arguing that there was no juvenile court
authority and that the order created serious practical problems and policy
issues. After the woman gave birth to a nonaddicted child, the DCFS
withdrew its motion to vacate the order.
The General Assembly returned to the criminal code in 1986. It
repealed the feticide act of 1981 and replaced it with a more compre-
hensive scheme .4  New laws deemed the unborn a possible victim of
intentional homicide, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter,
reckless homicide, battery and aggravated battery. The new scheme thus
broadened the forms of culpable conduct resulting in the termination
of potential life. More importantly, it broadened the forms of relevant
injury to include disabilities at birth. As with the earlier abortion and
feticide laws, prosecutions were disallowed against pregnant women whose
unborn children were harmed.
As early as 1987, a child custody proceeding was initiated in Win-
nebago County as a result of a birth of a drug-exposed newborn."4 In
43. People v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639 (11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1982).
44. The case description is gleaned from Letter from Thomas Bruno to Jeffrey A.
Parness (May 11, 1984) and from Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate, Illinois
DCFS, ex rel. Baby Doe Ridgeway, No. 82-J-319 (6th Cir. Ill.) (copies on file with
author). See also Marianne Taylor, 'Addicted' Fetus Sparks Court Battle, Chi. Trib.,
Apr. 9, 1984, § 1, at I).
45. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 1 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (1989). The Louisiana
high court's surprising, and disturbing, failure to respect similar Louisiana legislation is
recounted in Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting
the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 Harv. J. on Legis. 97, 132 (1985).
46. Information was gleaned in the Fall of 1991, from a review of Winnebago County
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one 1987 case, birth was to a woman with a history of mental illness
who was ordered by the court to cooperate with DCFS and whose
parental rights were terminated (as they had been with other children).
Similar cases have risen dramatically since late 1989, largely in response
to the legislation which is later described.
47
In 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed again the parameters
of tort law protection of potential human life. In Staliman v. Youngquist,4
a child sued her mother for injuries sustained during an automobile
collision when mom was approximately five months pregnant with the
child. The court refused to recognize the claim by the child against her
mother for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries. The court
found state law did not recognize that a fetus had rights superior to
those of the mother, though it hastened to emphasize the ruling was
not intended otherwise to minimize the public policy favoring healthy
births.4 9 The court recognized some room for legal change as it conceded
the legislature, after thorough investigation, study and debate, might
impose a legally cognizable duty on the part of pregnant women to
their developing fetuses.5 0
In 1989, several new laws protective of the unborn were passed.
Most significantly, the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act was
amended to include within its definition of "neglected child" a newborn
whose blood or urine contained any amount of a controlled substance.,
Amendments also expanded those required to report (to DCFS) such
neglected children to include "substance abuse treatment personnel,"
who were mandated to make referrals to help pregnant addicts obtain
needed counseling and treatment. 2 At the same time, DCFS was obli-
gated by law to give priority to pregnant women in residential drug and
alcohol treatment and counseling centers, and to "develop special pro-
grams for case finding and service coordination for addicted pregnant
women."' 3 Further, in 1989 the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 was amended
State's Attorney's case files (undertaken with the cooperation of State's Attorney Paul
Logli), as well as from interviews with present and former Winnebago County prosecutors
(especially Gary Golian on November 5, 1991).
47. According to one former prosecutor, Gary Golian, supra note 46, before the new
laws were enacted, cases were brought under a variety of statutes, including those involving
physical injuries to minors, substantial risk of physical injuries to minors, and parental
failure to provide necessary care. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, 802-31 (1989).
48. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Il. 1988).
49. Id. at 359.
50. Id. at 361.
51. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, 1 2053 (1989).
52. 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, 11 2054 and 2057.3b (1989). Other state laws are reviewed
in Jones, supra note 19, at 1164-65.
53. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111 1/2, 16359-1 (1989) and Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, 155.50
(1989).
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to include as a neglected minor any newborn whose blood or urine
contains a controlled substance; 54 this amendment eased the way for
local prosecutors and DCFS to question parental custody of such infants.
In addition, the Illinois Public Aid Code was amended to require medical
or health care providers servicing public aid recipients to refer pregnant
women suspected of drug abuse or addiction "to a local substance abuse
treatment provider," where the cost of treatment would be covered and
where there would be no sanctions on account of such substance abuse."
Other enactments mandated the creation of programs for the care and
treatment of addicted pregnant women. 56 Related laws, which became
effective the first day of 1990, required county clerks to provide with
each marriage license a pamphlet describing the causes and effects of
fetal alcohol syndrome and required sellers of alcoholic liquors to post
a sign in plain view which warned of the risks of birth defects caused
by pregnant women who drink. 7
At the time these laws were being debated, the Winnebago County
State's Attorney unsuccessfully sought to indict Melanie Green for the
death of her newborn. Specifically, it was alleged on May 8, 1989 that
Green had earlier caused the death of her baby, Bianca, two days after
birth, by "oxygen deprivation linked to cocaine exposure late in the
pregnancy. 58 Green was charged with involuntary manslaughter and
delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. The charges were heavily
criticized, with some saying the State was trespassing on Green's rights
of "bodily integrity and privacy" and others saying drug-taking mothers
would be scared away from treatment.5 9 The charges were filed amidst
growing numbers of drug-exposed newborns in the county. Three weeks
later, the case ended when the grand jury refused to indict. Evidently,
some members of the grand jury were concerned with Green's right to
privacy, as well as with the applicability of existing criminal statutes to
Green's conduct 0 Many were relieved with the grand jury's action; one
commentator said:
54. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, 802-3(1)(c) (1989).
55. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, 5-5 (1989).
56. Ii. Rev. Stat. ch. 111 1/2, 16354-3 (1989) and Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, 155.50
(1989).
57. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, 203 (1989) and !11. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, 1 139a (1989)
(Public Acts 86-832 and 86-823).
58. Mother Charged After Her Baby Dies of Cocaine, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989,
§ A, at 18, col. 1.
59. Patrick Reardon, Baby's Cocaine Death Adds to Debate on Protection of the
Unborn, Chi. Trib., May 14, 1989, Perspective Section, at 1; Patrick Reardon, Grand
Jury Won't Indict Mother in Baby's Drug Death, Chi. Trib., May 27, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 5.
60. Isabel Wilkerson, Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in Drug Death of
Newborn, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5 (paraphrasing the State's Attorney,
Paul Logli).
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Yes, the real problem with the Green case is that it rests on
the premise that a pregnant woman's womb is. society's incu-
bator. And if society, through its prosecutors, can control what
a woman does during pregnancy, isn't the next step for that
same society to tell a woman when she cannot or must become
pregnant? Until we can answer those questions we should all
offer a collective thank-you to grand jurors who know when to
rein in a runaway prosecutor.6'
Upon the grand jury's refusal to indict, that prosecutor said, "I am
calling on the Illinois legislature to begin work on a scheme of legislation
to address the very pressing issues brought on by this prosecution. '6 2
These calls prompted quick action by Winnebago County officials,
who within five months of the Green case introduced a proposal in the
General Assembly to criminalize "conduct injurious to the unborn. 63
The proposed crime encompassed acts by pregnant women who use a
dangerous or narcotic drug and whose later-born children show signs
of such drugs in blood or urine. In expressing support for the proposal,
the State's Attorney also expressed hope that "other legislation might
be introduced by the medical and social welfare communities to make
more readily available treatment alternatives for women in need of
prenatal care or drug treatment while pregnant." The proposed leg-
islation was never seriously considered.
In early 1991 in Winnebago County, Lee Ann Moore, then pregnant,
was released from jail after serving three months for felony prostitution.65
She was ordered to report regularly to a probation officer. At about
the same time, the alleged father of Moore's unborn child wrote the
State's Attorney .with an "impassioned plea" for state intervention on
61. B. D. Colen, Reining in Runaway Prosecutors, Newsday, June 6, 1989, at 13.
62. Joe Lamb, Grand Jury Won't Indict Coke Mom, Rockford Reg. Star, May 27,
1991, at 1. The prosecutor has indicated that the grand jury's action was prompted, in
part, by its discomfort with applying general statutes on delivery of drugs and on in-
voluntary manslaughter to maternal drug use, as well as its sympathy for the grieving
mother. Logli, supra note 25, at 562 n.1 1. The Florida Supreme Court also recently found
a general statute on delivery of controlled substances to be inapplicable to a pregnant
woman's acts. State v. Johnson, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
63. 1989 Session of the Eighty-sixth General Assembly of Illinois, H.B. 2835 (Rep-
resentatives Hallock and Giorgi).
64. Rick Pearson, Cocaine-baby Debate Legislature-Bound, Chi. Trib., Nov. 23, 1989,
§ 2, at 14, col. 1.
65. The case description is gleaned from a review of Winnebago County State's
Attorney's case file (undertaken with the cooperation of State's Attorney Paul Logli). See
also Addicted Mother Gets Probation, Chi. Daily L. Bull., May II, 1991, at 1, col. 5;
Maria Mills and Wilson Ring, Woman Held in Drug Unit to Protect Unborn Child, Chi.
Trib., Apr. 11, 1991, § 1, at 1, col. 5; Betsy Burkhard, Judge Puts "Coke Mom" Under
Armed Guard, Rockford Reg. Star. Apr. 10, 1991, at 1.
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account of Moore's drug use. Shortly after her release, Moore was
arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. Because Moore's condition
presented a "liability" and "financial" risk, county officials did not
want to keep her, and she was released without having to post a cash
bond. Thereafter, Moore failed to appear for a court-ordered interview
at an in-patient facility with a program for pregnant addicts; she was
later arrested for that failure-which was alleged to constitute a violation
of her probation. Upon finding its probation order violated, a state
trial judge ordered around-the-clock oversight of Moore at the in-patient
facility. A few weeks later, Moore delivered a healthy boy at a local
hospital and shortly thereafter walked away. A little while later, Moore
was placed on probation and ordered into drug treatment. Moore was
thereafter arrested for possession of cocaine, and a few months later
was sentenced to serve a three-year term with the Department of Cor-
rections on her conviction for prostitution.
Contemporaneous with events in the Moore case, a Winnebago
County legislator introduced in the General Assembly a bill on com-
pulsory testing for prenatal drug or alcohol exposure." Specifically, the
April, 1991 proposal called for mandatory testing of all newborns; it
said, "A physician shall administer to each newborn infant born under
the physician's care a toxicology test to determine whether there is
evidence of prenatal exposure to alcohol or a controlled substance." 6
Positive test results would be reported under the Abused and Neglected
Child Reporting Act.68 The proposal also required tests of pregnant
women where there was evidence of prenatal exposure; it said,
A physician shall administer a toxicology test to a pregnant
woman under the physician's care to determine whether there
is evidence that she has ingested alcohol or a controlled sub-
stance, if the woman has obstetrical complications that are a
medical indication of the possible use of alcohol or a controlled
substance for a nonmedical purpose.69
Positive test results here were to be confidential, though reported to
the physician, the Public Health Department, and local health authorities,
and would prompt offers of referral for chemical dependency assessment
66. 1991 Session of Eighty-seventh General Assembly of Illinois, H.B. 1343 (Rep-
resentative Giorgi). The Winnebago prosecutor supported the proposal, in part, because
it would eliminate racial and class bias in reporting of prenatal abuse. Logli, supra note
25, at 565.
67. 1991 Session of Eighty-seventh General Assembly of Illinois, H.B. 1343 (Rep-
resentative Giorgi).
68. I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, 2053 (1989).
69. 1991 Session of Eighty-seventh General Assemply of Illinois, H.B. 1343 (Rep-
resentative Giorgi).
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or treatment, as well as offers of referral for prenatal care. Finally, the
proposal also recognized that similar services could be offered after the
investigation of reports of suspected illegal prenatal exposure filed by
non-physicians.
In September of 1991, the Cook County, Illinois, Public Guardian
sued DCFS for needlessly confining cocaine babies to hospitals for weeks
or months and for failing to provide appropriate foster or residential
placements for drug-exposed infants. 70 Hospital stays for such infants
in Chicago beyond the point of medical necessity were allegedly due to
the fact that the Illinois Department of Public Aid-not DCFS-paid
for hospitalization. Hospital stays were said to cost up to $18,000 a
month per child, while some foster-home care settings were said to cost
DCFS $1000-$2500 a month per child.
A few months later, the Illinois Supreme Court expanded upon its
earlier recognition in tort law that the termination of potential life caused
personal injuries to those anticipating healthy births. Prior to November,
1991, prospective parents could recover certain damages under the
Wrongful Death Act for "pecuniary injuries" resulting from the death
of their unborn fetus-including loss of income and services which the
deceased would have generated had he lived." In November, in Seef v.
Sutkus,72 Illinois' high court ruled the parents could also recover for
the loss of society (deprivation of the deceased's companionship, guid-
ance, advice, love and affection).
The economic consequences of the increasing numbers of drug and
alcohol exposed newborns was returned to the public agenda in Decem-
ber, 1991, when the Chicago Tribune headlined on its front page a story
about the financial burdens on schools caused by cocaine babies who
lived through infancy and toddlerhood."1 The story began, "At least
10,000 Illinois children born with cocaine in their systems are now
reaching grade-school age." It went on to report that experts said "the
cost in medical care, foster care and special education for these children
could reach $50 million to $100 million a year." And, it said New York
expected "to spend $2 billion in the next 15 years to care for and
70. Matt O'Connor, State Sued on Cocaine Baby Care, Chi. Trib., Sept. 27, 1991,
§ 2, at i. col. 6. More recently, DCFS floated a "suggestion" that it would no longer
take custody of all drug-addicted babies. Some have suggested such a move is founded
on cost-cutting rationales though DCFS denies this. Rob Karwarth, DCFS Wants to Take
Custody of Fewer Cocaine Babies, Chi. Trib., June 10, 1992, § 2, at 5, col. I.
71. Jones v. Karraker, 457 N.E.2d 23, 28 (Il1. 1983) (Simon, J., dissenting).
72. 583 N.E.2d 510 (I1. 1991).
73. Jean Larz Griffin and Teresa Wiltz, Schools' Newest Burden: Cocaine Babies,
Chi. Trib., Dec. 1, 1991, § I, at 1. The estimated numbers, problems and costs of exposed
newborns are reviewed in Jones, supra note 19, at 1160-63; Maternal Cocaine Use Raises
Delivery Costs, Need for Neonatal Care, 24 Fam. Plan. Persp. 93 (1992).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
educate a projected 72,000 children who will have been born to crack-
addicted mothers there by the turn of the century."
As well, in December of 1991, the Chicago Tribune reported on a
study suggesting that while "white and 'black women in Illinois show
similar rates of illegal drug use during pregnancy," black women who
have exposed their fetuses to illegal drugs are much more likely to be
reported to DCFS under the law mandating reports of any suspected
prenatal exposure to illegal drugs. The study also indicates that black
women were much more likely to be subjected to testing for illegal
drugs than were white women.74
C. Reflections on the Illinois Responses to Roe v. Wade
The examination of the post-Roe laws in Winnebago County, Illinois
indicate that there have been increasing state and local protections of
the unborn with both coercive and noncoercive elements. The new safe-
guards address the conduct of many, including mothers and prospective
mothers of children born alive.
The inquiry further reveals that efforts to protect better the unborn
have been resisted at times with misplaced reliance on Roe v. Wade.
That decision does not disallow all governmental protection of the
unborn, does recognize such protection is more easily sustained when
there are no burdens on constitutional interests, and does not extend
constitutional protection to all forms of conduct by pregnant women.
This seemingly was not fully understood during the attempted prosecution
of Melanie Green for delivering cocaine to her fetus. While it may be
that existing Illinois law did not criminalize her conduct, a prosecution
clearly would not have burdened any rights of bodily integrity or privacy.
Whether pregnant or not, Green had no constitutional interest in in-
gesting cocaine. Green did have constitutional interests in being treated
fairly, with no racially or class discriminatory animus (or effect). How-
ever, such issues of fairness were apparently not raised in her case.
Further, concerns about how such criminal prosecutions would scare
drug-taking mothers away from treatment not only are presently un-
supported empirically, but also-if true-appear overblown in Illinois
given the mandates of new child abuse and neglect reporting laws (which
pose an even greater deterrent).
In the Green case, as elsewhere, commentary on state efforts to
protect the unborn have frequently failed to take account of related
developments. The State's Attorney in Winnebago County did not decide
in a vacuum to charge Melanie Green. Whether wise or not, his conduct
74. Helaine Olen, Racial Tinge to Drug Testing of New Moms, Chi. Trib., Dec. 19,
1991, § 3, at 14.
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clearly reflected growing and significant state and local sentiments that
the unborn should be more fully protected. If the pregnancy police were
at work, they were armed with more than their own personal judgments;
they were not "runaway" prosecutors.
The inquiry into Illinois law since Roe does reveal some difficulties.
Particularly with respect to coercive laws, scant attention has been paid
to date to the conduct of those who assist pregnant women in exposing
the unborn to danger. The focus has been on the Melanie Greens and
the Lee Ann Moores. Yet, should we not also consider the responsibilities
of those who supplied the illegal drugs? One Illinois criminal law pro-
vides:
Any person who violates ... the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another
commits the offense of drug induced infliction of great bodily
harm if any person experiences great bodily harm or permanent
disability as a result of the injection, inhalation or ingestion of
any amount of that controlled substance.7"
Does it not suggest that others beside Melanie Green may be criminally
liable for Bianca's death? Consider as well the tort liability cases in-
volving prenatal injuries. Do they also not indicate that legal respon-
sibilities should be extended beyond mothers?76
Particularly worthy of attention now are the legal duties of pro-
spective fathers outside the criminal law. Certainly the Florida Supreme
Court was correct in recognizing the responsibility of "the biological
father, wed or unwed, ... to provide support during the prebirth
period." 71 Yet, such prebirth support duties should not be considered
solely when the father's rights are later weighed in an adoption pro-
ceeding. Such prebirth duties are important not only when resolving the
question of terminating parental rights, but also when enforcing a pro-
spective father's financial or other responsibilities prior to birth. Prebirth
child support orders, for example, should be readily available to pregnant
women.7 s It seems only fair since there are now at least some mechanisms
75. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, 112-4.7 (Supp. 1990). Consider also Fox v. Custis, 712
F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) (state duty to protect those for whom it assumed a special
custodial or other relationship); State v. Williams, 670 P.2d 122 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(mom convicted of child abuse for failing to seek help when dad beat their child); Jones,
supra note 19, at 1180 ("Penalties for sale (of illegal drugs) to pregnant women could
be increased.").
76. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (III. 1977) (finding
a child, not conceived at the time of negligent acts, can nevertheless sue the tortfeasors
for resulting injuries).
77. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989).
78. Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 13 U. Ark.
Little Rock L.J. 165, 176 (1991).
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for prospective fathers who seek orders directed at pregnant women and
aimed at protecting potential human life (e.g., requests for caesarian
sections or other medical treatment). 79 Contrasted with coercive orders
against pregnant women, prebirth paternity support orders are not prone
to thorny constitutional issues involving autonomous decisionmaking,
bodily integrity, childrearing, and the like. As well, should not the child
abuse and neglect reporting laws cover the conduct of prospective fathers
and others? Consider the likes of an Alan Greer,s0 men who beat
pregnant women with fists and broomsticks. One recent study found
that the rate of domestic violence against pregnant women is greater
than previously thought, with one in six having endured physical or
sexual abuse during pregnancy."
Beside providing for adequate prenatal paternal support, new laws
could also help educate prospective fathers about their prebirth legal
duties, as well as the risks posed to future generations by their present
conduct. Recent federal laws requiring warning labels on cigarette
packages"2 and whiskey bottles,83 as well as the Illinois laws requiring
county clerks issuing marriage licenses to give notice about fetal alcohol
syndrome, are only a beginning. As laws require doctors to convey
certain information on abortion in order to promote informed deci-
sionmaking, laws could also require that information be conveyed to
all prospective parents on the techniques and responsibilities of proper
prenatal care. Our greater contemporary understanding of the impact
of prebirth maternal, rather than paternal, conduct on future children
does not justify the almost exclusive focus to date on the need to convey
information about good prenatal care to women. It is time to focus on
men, especially as the informational gap about the causes of birth
disabilities may be diminishing. 4
The inquiry into Illinois law reveals difficulties beyond the inadequate
attention paid third parties, especially prospective fathers. When focusing
79. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence
of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1951 (1986); Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal
Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 461 (1991).
80. People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980). Consider also Joyce C. Abma and
Frank L. Mott, Substance Abuse and Prenatal Care During Pregnancy Among Young
Women, 23 Fam. Plan. Persp. 117, 122 (1991) (suggesting prebirth paternal acts will
promote better maternal acts when saying there is "strong evidence that prospective mothers
whose children's father is not in the home are both more likely to use substances and
less likely to obtain appropriate early prenatal care").
81. Michael Campbeil, Study: 17% of Pregnant Women Abused, Chi. Trib., June
18, 1992, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1988).
83. 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1988).
84. See, e.g., Brendon C. Coleman, Cocaine Use Among Men May Increase Risks
to Kids, Rockford Reg. Star, Oct. 9, 1991, § A, at 6, col. 1; Cocaine Use May Affect
Male Sperm, Chi. Trib., Oct. 9, 1991, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
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on the pregnant women themselves, state officials-perhaps uninten-
tionally-have acted coercively against primarily poor, black women. As
noted earlier, while there may be no constitutionally-protected interests
in ingesting illegal drugs, the Melanie Greens and Lee Ann Moores of
Winnebago County and elsewhere do have interests in fair treatment,
that is, treatment not founded on racial or economic status. In and out
of Illinois there is some evidence that at least certain coercive laws are
enforced in a discriminatory manner. Late in 1991 itwas reported that
prenatal drug testing and reports of prenatal drug exposure in Illinois
may be tainted by racial biases. That same year Professor Dorothy
Roberts noted that the increasing, coercive governmental actions against
pregnant women nationally were similarly tainted. 5 Such discrimination
must be ended. But in doing so, state officers need not abandon their
coercive efforts under criminal and civil laws. As suggested earlier, there
are coercive actions on behalf of the unborn which should be directed
against white or rich mothers or prospective mothers as well as against
nonmothers. Undertaking such actions should reduce the otherwise le-
gitimate concerns over sex and class bias. 6 Why have there not yet been
governmental efforts in Winnebago County against doctors who have
failed to act on behalf of the unborn of white, well-to-do, drug-using,
pregnant patients? 7 Similarly, why have there apparently been no noted
efforts to date against prospective fathers who act in ways dangerous
to their future offspring, as by delivering illegal drugs to their pregnant
mates?
At least in Illinois, public policy seemingly suggests not only that
coercive efforts be considered for prospective fathers, and even strangers
to expectant moms, but also that certain forms of coercion may be less
appropriate against pregnant women than against others. Both before
and after the decision in Roe v. Wade, Illinois legislators exempted
pregnant women from those subject to prosecution for criminal abortion.
As well, the 1981 and 1986 Illinois criminal laws protective of potential
human life from homicide, assault and the like also excluded pregnant
women as potential defendants. Further, the Illinois Supreme Court
85. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color
Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1450 (1991).
86. The harmful effects of particular biases may be significantly compounded when
a woman has several distinguishing traits. See, e.g., id. at 1424 (in discussing the possible
criminal prosecution of pregnant black drug addicts, Professor Roberts notes that "[bllack
women experience various forms of oppression simultaneously, as a complex interaction
of race, gender and class that is more than the sum of its parts.").
87. The local prosecutor has recognized that "legitimate concerns have been raised
regarding what appears to be a racial and economic imbalance in the women being referred
to the child protection system as substance abusing mothers." Logli, supra note 25, at
565.
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recently failed to sustain a claim by a child against her mother for
unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries, though comparable claims
against strangers had been sustained.
Finally, Illinois public policy suggests a continuation of both coercive
and noncoercive efforts on behalf of the unborn. Inadequate are solely
noncoercive laws, mandating such efforts as education or the availability
of prenatal care, even if combined with treatment for drug or alcohol
abuse. Unfortunately, there remain people-like Alan Greer-wh0 can
but are unwilling to act on behalf of the unborn for reasons few of
us comprehend or condone. And, there are not now-nor will there
likely soon be-adequate public resources so that potential life protection
is maximized by noncoercive laws. With increasing dangers to increasing
numbers of future children now the pattern, coercive governmental ef-
forts to help stem the tide are needed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the difficulties of constitutional interpretation, of
line-drawing and balancing, and of guiding and dictating social behavior
through regulation, governmental efforts protecting the unborn from the
dangers posed by mom and others are on the rise. Coercive measures
are appearing as voluntary governmental programs involving prenatal
care, educational advancement, drug treatment, and the like have been
deemed inadequate, both because necessary funding simply cannot be
found and because some people continue to act in bad ways. An ex-
amination of recent legal developments nationally, and in Winnebago
County, Illinois, indicates the preventable tragedies of premature infant
deaths and birth disabilities can be better- addressed. These tragedies
should be addressed by carefully-drawn laws which are subject to con-
stant reexamination. These laws should more fully cover those, especially
prospective fathers, whose conduct poses dangers to , potential human
life.
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